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Differential Games and Oligopoly Theory: An Overview

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  • R. Cellini
  • L. Lambertini

Abstract

We illustrate the foundations of the theory of differential games, with particular regard to the definition of information sets and solutions concepts. Then, we provide a survey of several relevant applications of the theory to modelling the behavior of oligopolic firms.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Differential Games and Oligopoly Theory: An Overview," Working Papers 369, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:369
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