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Product homogeneity as a prisoner's dilemma in a duopoly with R&D

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  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Rossini, Gianpaolo

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  • Lambertini, Luca & Rossini, Gianpaolo, 1998. "Product homogeneity as a prisoner's dilemma in a duopoly with R&D," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 297-301, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:58:y:1998:i:3:p:297-301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 225-235, Spring.
    2. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
    3. Harrington Jr. , Joseph E., 1995. "Experimentation and Learning in a Differentiated-Products Duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 275-288, June.
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