Multi-market Collusion with Territorial Allocation
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- Bhattacharjea, Aditya & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2015. "Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 42-50.
- Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2012. "Multi-Market Collusion With Territorial Allocation," Working Papers id:5170, eSocialSciences.
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Cited by:
- Bhattacharjea, Aditya & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2015.
"Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 42-50.
- Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2012. "Multi-Market Collusion With Territorial Allocation," Working Papers id:5170, eSocialSciences.
- Aditya Bhattacharjea & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2012. "Multi-market Collusion with Territorial Allocation," Working papers 217, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- repec:nea:journl:y:2017:i:35:p:170-176 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywords
Multimarket contact; collusion; trade costs; territorial allocation; cartels;JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2012-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-10-20 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-10-20 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2012-10-20 (Industrial Organization)
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