Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior
We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard. Copyright © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
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