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International Trade Aspects of Competition Policy

In: Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region

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  • Sadao Nagaoka

Abstract

Recently competition policy has become an important trade policy issue, since many policy makers now see competition policy as an important instrument to secure market access' to foreign markets. This paper analyzes this issue both from a theoretical point of view and from the review of the recent development of the Japanese competition policy. While voluntary trade cartels have a strongly negative international spillover, export cartels or international cartels do not constrain market access,' and export restraints were often used to ameliorate trade frictions. Moreover, domestic cartels often have a positive international spillover on the export from foreign countries. Thus, the recent focus on competition policy from market access' concern is misleading. The Japanese government has substantially strengthened its competition policy in the 1990s, especially in terms of drastic reduction of cartels exempted from the application of Antimonopoly Law and in strengthening its enforcement against cartels. While these changes of competition policy would be highly beneficial to the Japanese economy, it is not clear whether such policy changes could have a substantial impact on market access.'
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Suggested Citation

  • Sadao Nagaoka, 2000. "International Trade Aspects of Competition Policy," NBER Chapters, in: Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region, pages 55-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:8477
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ordover, Janusz A. & Saloner, Garth, 1989. "Predation, monopolization, and antitrust," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 537-596, Elsevier.
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    4. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    5. Jerry A. Hausman & Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, 1988. "Price Discrimination and Patent Policy," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 253-265, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009. "Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 599-621, August.
    2. Raff, Horst & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2005. "Endogenous vertical restraints in international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1877-1889, October.
    3. Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2004. "EXPORT CARTELS : A Developing Country Perspective," Working papers 120, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation

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