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Empirical Games: The Oligopoly Case

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  • Margaret E. Slade

Abstract

In this paper, I examine methods used to construct and estimate game-theoretic models of oligopolistic interactions, and I survey some of the empirical findings. Both static and dynamic games are covered. Static models provide useful summary statistics concerning the outcomes of oligopolistic interaction, whereas dynamic models attempt to capture more complex strategic behavior. In the exposition of static games, I consider two empirical approaches: the first-order approach and the dual approach. When we turn to dynamics, I limit my remarks to state-space games - games in which actions taken in one period shift payoffs in subsequent periods. With state-space games, all history that is pay-off relevant is summarized by a small set of variables - the state - and players' strategies depend only on the state and time.

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  • Margaret E. Slade, 1995. "Empirical Games: The Oligopoly Case," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 368-402, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:2:p:368-402
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    Cited by:

    1. Caputo, Michael R., 2007. "The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 198-224, November.
    2. Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009. "Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 599-621, August.
    3. Gordon M. Bodnar & Bernard Dumas & Richard C. Marston, 2002. "Pass-through and Exposure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 199-231, February.
    4. Paulo Brito & Bipasa Datta & Huw Dixon, 2012. "The evolution of the mixed conjectures in the rent-extraction game," Discussion Papers 12/33, Department of Economics, University of York.
    5. Figuieres, Charles & Tidball, Mabel & Jean-Marie, Alain, 2004. "On the effects of conjectures in a symmetric strategic setting," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-102, March.
    6. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 2015. "Endogenous Horizontal Product Differentiation under Bertrand and Cournot Competition: Revisiting the Bertrand Paradox," NBER Working Papers 20966, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 577-600, March.
    8. AMIR, Rabah, 2001. "Stochastic games in economics and related fields: an overview," CORE Discussion Papers 2001060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Ani L. Katchova & Ian M. Sheldon & Mario J. Miranda, 2005. "A dynamic model of oligopoly and oligopsony in the U.S. potato-processing industry," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(3), pages 409-428.
    10. Haufler, A. & Schjelderup, G., 1999. "Tacit Collusion under Destination- and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation," Papers 8/99, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
    11. repec:spr:joptap:v:152:y:2012:i:1:d:10.1007_s10957-011-9880-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Graham, Paul & Thorpe, Sally & Hogan, Lindsay, 1999. "Non-competitive market behaviour in the international coking coal market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 195-212, June.
    13. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 2015. "Intra-industry trade with Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly: The role of endogenous horizontal product differentiation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 157-165.
    14. Hastings, Justine, 2000. "Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: An Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt0bw767hm, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    15. Marcel Canoy & S. Onderstal, 2003. "Tight oligopolies: in search of proportionate remedies," CPB Document 29, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    16. Goo, Moon Mo, 1997. "The measurement of market power: short-run, long-run, and dynamic adjustment models," ISU General Staff Papers 1997010108000012985, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    17. Deodhar, Satish Y. & Fletcher, Stanley M., 1998. "Degree Of Competition In The U.S. Peanut Butter Industry: A Dynamic Error Correction Approach," Faculty Series 16725, University of Georgia, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    18. Jean-Marie, Alain & Tidball, Mabel, 2006. "Adapting behaviors through a learning process," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 399-422, July.
    19. Seki, Erika, 2006. "Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 106-135, June.
    20. Ian Sheldon & Richard Sperling, 2003. "Estimating the Extent of Imperfect Competition in the Food Industry: What Have We Learned?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 89-109.
    21. Kamerschen, David R. & Klein, Peter G. & Porter, David V., 2005. "Market structure in the US electricity industry: A long-term perspective," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 731-751, September.

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