Semicollusion in the Norwegian Cement Market
A model of semicollusion, where firms collude on prices and compete on capacities, is tailor-made to the characteristics of the Norwegian cement market and tested empirically on this particular market for the period 1927-1982. The results indicate that the rapid increase in capacity and thereby in exports in the period 1956 to 1967, the late phase of the price cartel, best can be explained by the market sharing agreement : each firm overinvested in capacity to receive a large quota in the domestic market.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.|
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
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