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Polish cement industry cartel - preliminary examination of collusion existence

Author

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  • Sylwester Bejger

    () (Faculty of Economics and Management Nicholas Copernicus University of Torun, Poland)

Abstract

The paper is devoted to a case of a cartel in Polish cement industry. Short description of the industry and characteristics of the cartel with its fundamental illegal practices, market sharing and price fixing have been done. We focused on examination of possibility of detection of a cartel like behavior of players in an industry on a basis of cartel markers’ evaluation, using statistical data we can actually obtain. On a basis of examination of market shares of players and price/supply processes we found distinctive, theoretically motivated patterns characteristic for collusive equilibrium in an industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylwester Bejger, 2011. "Polish cement industry cartel - preliminary examination of collusion existence," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 4(1), pages 88-107, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:pdc:jrnbeh:v:4:y:2011:i:1:p:88-107
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rodrigo Zeidan & Marcelo Resende, 2009. "Measuring Market Conduct in the Brazilian Cement Industry: A Dynamic Econometric Investigation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(3), pages 231-244, May.
    2. John Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, 2006. "Statistics On Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005," Working Papers 06-11, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    3. Korbinian Blanckenburg & Alexander Geist, 2009. "How Can a Cartel Be Detected?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 15(4), pages 421-436, November.
    4. de Roos, Nicolas, 2004. "A model of collusion timing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 351-387, March.
    5. Christian Lorenz, 2008. "Screening markets for cartel detection: collusive markers in the CFD cartel-audit," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 213-232, October.
    6. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Frode Steen, 2006. "On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian Cement Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 321-338, March.
    7. Steen, Frode & Sorgard, Lars, 1999. "Semicollusion in the Norwegian cement market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(9), pages 1775-1796, October.
    8. Harrington, Joseph E., 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 1-105, August.
    9. repec:kap:iaecre:v:15:y:2009:i:4:p:421-436 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Levenstein, Margaret & Suslow, Valerie Y. & Oswald, Lynda J., 2003. "Contemporary International Cartels And Developing Countries: Economic Effects And Implications For Competition Policy," Working Papers 14590, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fink, Nikolaus & Frübing, Stefan, 2015. "Legal and illegal cartels in the European cement industry," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-066, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    2. repec:eee:riibaf:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:745-768 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cartel detection; collusion markers; industry studies; cement market.;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L60 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - General

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