Polish cement industry cartel - preliminary examination of collusion existence
The paper is devoted to a case of a cartel in Polish cement industry. Short description of the industry and characteristics of the cartel with its fundamental illegal practices, market sharing and price fixing have been done. We focused on examination of possibility of detection of a cartel like behavior of players in an industry on a basis of cartel markers’ evaluation, using statistical data we can actually obtain. On a basis of examination of market shares of players and price/supply processes we found distinctive, theoretically motivated patterns characteristic for collusive equilibrium in an industry.
Volume (Year): 4 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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