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Polish cement industry cartel - preliminary examination of collusion existence

Author

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  • Sylwester Bejger

    (Faculty of Economics and Management Nicholas Copernicus University of Torun, Poland)

Abstract

The paper is devoted to a case of a cartel in Polish cement industry. Short description of the industry and characteristics of the cartel with its fundamental illegal practices, market sharing and price fixing have been done. We focused on examination of possibility of detection of a cartel like behavior of players in an industry on a basis of cartel markers’ evaluation, using statistical data we can actually obtain. On a basis of examination of market shares of players and price/supply processes we found distinctive, theoretically motivated patterns characteristic for collusive equilibrium in an industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylwester Bejger, 2011. "Polish cement industry cartel - preliminary examination of collusion existence," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 4(1), pages 88-107, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:pdc:jrnbeh:v:4:y:2011:i:1:p:88-107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sylwester Bejger, 2015. "Screening for competition failures: some remarks on horizontal anticompetitive behavior visual detection," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 14(2), pages 169-188, June.
    2. Yaseen GHULAM, 2018. "The Impact Of Reforms And Privatization On Firms’ Conduct In The Presence Of Interconnected Conglomerates And Weak And Inefficient Regulatory Institutions," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(4), pages 599-622, December.
    3. Matthias Hunold & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger & Johannes Muthers, 2020. "Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 737-779, December.
    4. Bejger, Sylwester, 2012. "Cartel in the Indian cement industry: An attempt to identify it," Economics Discussion Papers 2012-18, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Delina Agnosteva & Constantinos Syropoulos & Yoto V. Yotov, 2017. "Multimarket Linkages, Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 6829, CESifo.
    6. Joseph E. Harrington & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2018. "Rent sharing to control noncartel supply in the German cement market," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 149-166, March.
    7. Ghulam, Yaseen, 2017. "Long-run performance of an industry after broader reforms including privatization," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 745-768.
    8. Bejger, Sylwester, 2011. "Polish cement industry cartel- preliminary examination of collusion existence," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center (PRADEC), vol. 4(1), pages 1-20, January.
    9. Fink, Nikolaus & Frübing, Stefan, 2015. "Legal and illegal cartels in the European cement industry," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-066, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cartel detection; collusion markers; industry studies; cement market.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L60 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - General

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