When Do Firms Leave Cartels? Determinants And The Impact On Cartel Survival
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- Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2017. "When do firms leave cartels? Determinants and the impact on cartel survival," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-002, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Heim, Sven & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Spiegel, Yossi, 2017.
"Minority share acquisitions and collusion: Evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs,"
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- Heim, Sven & Hueschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Spiegel, Yossi, 2018. "Minority share acquisitions and collusion: evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs," CEPR Discussion Papers 13327, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ludwig von Auer & Tu Anh Pham, 2019. "Optimal Destabilization of Cartels," Research Papers in Economics 2019-07, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsSurvival Analysis; Cartels; Duration; European Union;
- C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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