Screening markets for cartel detection - collusive marker in the CFD cartel-audit
Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) is a model that analyses real market processes with the help of time pattern analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently (See www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/cfd). The CFD cartel-audit should enable the detection of cartels via characteristic market process patterns. This is based on the assumption that existing cartels cause failures in the observed process patterns. The CFD cartel-audit attempts to draw conclusions from these process patterns in order to find hidden cartels and to engage antitrust agencies into additional more detailed audits.
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- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Chen, Joe, 2006.
"Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection,"
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- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Joe Chen, 2005. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-359, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983.
"Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity,"
83-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Asch, Peter & Seneca, Joseph J, 1975. "Characteristics of Collusive Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 223-37, March.
- Albaek, Svend & Mollgaard, Peter & Overgaard, Per B, 1997.
"Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 429-43, December.
- Svend Albæk & Peter Møllgaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1997. "Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case," CIE Discussion Papers 1997-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Veltins, Michael A. & Schaller, Armin & Blum, Ulrich, 2004. "The East German Cement Cartel : An Inquiry into Comparable Markets, Industry Structure, and Antitrust Policy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 04/04, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2001. "Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 167-204, 04.
- Robert Porter, 2005. "Detecting Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 147-167, December.
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