Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition
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More about this item
Keywordstacit collusion; cooperation; substitutes and complements; essentiality; joint marketing agreements; patent pools; independent licensing; unbundling; co-opetition;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-11-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2013-11-02 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2013-11-02 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2013-11-02 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-11-02 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2013-11-02 (Marketing)
- NEP-TID-2013-11-02 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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