Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices
Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins. (JEL D43, D82, K21, L12, L61, L65)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 101 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zheng, Bingyong, 2008. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 406-416, May.
- Dilip Abreu & Paul Milgrom & David Pearce, 1997.
"Information and timing in repeated partnerships,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
636, David K. Levine.
- Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984.
"Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2006. "The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00119553, HAL.
- William Fuchs, 2007.
"Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1432-1448, September.
- William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," Discussion Papers 04-012, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," 2005 Meeting Papers 431, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," Game Theory and Information 0511007, EconWPA.
- Kandori, Michihiro, 2002.
"Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
- Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-114, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 1999.
"Optimal Collusion with Private Information,"
99-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2005.
"Folk Theorem with Communication,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
366, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, December.
- Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
- Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005.
"The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring,"
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
- Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2006. "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1499-1544, November.
- Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:6:p:2425-49. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)or (Michael P. Albert)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.