Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses
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Other versions of this item:
- Aleksandra Boutin, 2016. "Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 64-94, August.
References listed on IDEAS
- Josh Lerner & Marcin Strojwas & Jean Tirole, 2007.
"The design of patent pools: the determinants of licensing rules,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, pages 610-625.
- Lerner, Josh & Strojwas, Marcin & Tirole, Jean, 2005. "The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules," IDEI Working Papers 187, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2013. "Cooperation vs. Collusion: How Essentiality Shapes Co-opetition," IDEI Working Papers 801, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jean Tirole, 2015. "Market Failures and Public Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1665-1682.
- Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2016.
"The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents,"
- Llobet, Gerard & Padilla, Atilano Jorge, 2016. "The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 11624, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Reisinger, Markus & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2016. "Patent Pools in Input Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11512, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
Keywordstechnology licensing; patent pools; substitutes and complements; independent licensing; price caps; joint marketing;
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- M20 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2014-04-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2014-04-05 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2014-04-05 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2014-04-05 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MKT-2014-04-05 (Marketing)
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