The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules
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|Date of creation:||Nov 2005|
|Publication status:||Published in The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 38, n°3, 2007, p. 610-625.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 TOULOUSE|
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- Bittlingmayer, George, 1988. "Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agreement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 227-248, April.
- Priest, George L, 1977. "Cartels and Patent License Arrangements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 309-377, October.
- Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
- Aoki, Reiko & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2005. "Coalition Formation for a Consortium Standard Through a Standard Body and a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from MPEG2, DVD and 3G," IIR Working Paper 05-01, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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