The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools
We examine patent pools in the context of a consortium standard. Although such pools of complementary technologies are approved by antitrust authorities, the actual implementation has proved to be problematic. We identify two possible obstacles: free riding and bargaining failure. We also examine the traditional RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing condition. We suggest formation, licensing and rent distribution methods more conducive to a successful patent pool operation
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|Date of creation:||11 Aug 2004|
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Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
d04-32, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Aoki, Reiko & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Discussion Paper 222, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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