Efficient Patent Pools
The paper builds a tractable model of patent pools, agreements among patent owners to license sets of their patents. It provides a necessary and sufficient condition for patent pools to enhance welfare and shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing. The paper allows patents to differ in importance, asymmetric blocking patterns, and licensors to also be licensees. We undertake some initial exploration of the impact of pools on innovation. The analysis has broader applicability than pools, being relevant to a number of co-marketing arrangements.
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|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in American Economic Review, vol.�94, n°3, juin 2004, p.�691-711.|
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- Hausman, Jerry A & Leonard, Gregory K & Tirole, Jean, 2003.
" On Nonexclusive Membership in Competing Joint Ventures,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 43-62, Spring.
- Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard & Jean Tirole, 2003. "On Non-Exclusive Membership in Competing Joint Ventures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000145, David K. Levine.
- Rasmusen, Eric, 1988. "Entry for Buyout," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 281-99, March.
- Vincenzo Denicolo, 2002. "Sequential innovation and the patent-antitrust conflict," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 649-668, October.
- Brueckner, Jan K & Whalen, W Tom, 2000. "The Price Effects of International Airline Alliances," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 503-45, October.
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