Formation of a Pool with Essential Patents
We examine why cooperation among essential patent holders may not occur, despite significant gains for them and the users. We use the sequential coalition formation framework to show that no coalition may form when the number of patent holders is large, if a firm initiating the coalition can negotiate only sequentially and individually with the rest. Our results, complementing Ray and Vohra (1999) suggest that voluntary sequential negotiation cannot prevent the emergence of "tragedy of anticommons", even if side payments are allowed.
|Length:||1, 15,  p.|
|Date of creation:||Mar 2007|
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- Aoki, Reiko & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2004.
"The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools,"
222, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Reiko Aoki & Sadao Nagaoka, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d04-32, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Reiko Aoki; Sadao Nagaoka, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 788, Econometric Society.
- Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
- Aoki, Reiko & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2005. "Coalition Formation for a Consortium Standard Through a Standard Body and a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from MPEG2, DVD and 3G," IIR Working Paper 05-01, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
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