Designing of research coalitions in promoting GEOSS. A brief overview of the literature
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References listed on IDEAS
- Cassiman, Bruno, 2000.
"Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 283-314, February.
- Bruno Cassiman, 1994. "Research Joint Ventures and Optimal R&D Policy with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 1105, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bruno Cassiman, 1994. "Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers 263, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1997.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori, 2003. "Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations," Working Papers 2003.40, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
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- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
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- Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2003. "Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control: a partition function approach," Chapters,in: The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
More about this item
Keywordscoalition theory; research coalitions; public goods;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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