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Patent pool under endogenous technology choice

  • Arijit Mukherjee

    (School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, UK)

It is generally believed that patent pools by complementary input suppliers make the consumers, final goods producers and the society better off by reducing the complements problem. We show that this may not be the case under endogenous technology choice. Although a patent pool reduces input price, it may make the consumers and the society worse off by reducing innovation. We also show that a patent pool makes the input suppliers better off, but it may not make all final goods producers better off compared with non-cooperation between the input suppliers.

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File URL: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/sbe/RePEc/lbo/lbowps/Mukherjee_lbowps_2013_07.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Loughborough University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 2013_07.

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Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision: Jul 2013
Handle: RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2013_07
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  1. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2008. "Complementary Patents and Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 7005, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Arijit Mukherjee & Enrico Pennings, 2004. "Imitation, patent protection, and welfare," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 715-733, October.
  3. Reiko Aoki & Sadao Nagaoka, 2004. "The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d04-32, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June.
  5. Choi, Jay Pil, 2009. "Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 417, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Ray Chaudhuri, Prabal, 1995. "Technological asymmetry and joint product development," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 23-39, March.
  7. Mookherjee, Dilip & Ray, Debraj, 1991. "On the competitive pressure created by the diffusion of innovations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 124-147, June.
  8. Arijit Mukherjee, 2001. "Does society prefer small innovation?," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2001/05, Department of Economics, Keele University.
  9. Mattoo, Aaditya & Olarreaga, Marcelo & Saggi, Kamal, 2004. "Mode of foreign entry, technology transfer, and FDI policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 95-111, October.
  10. Layne-Farrar, Anne & Lerner, Josh, 2011. "To join or not to join: Examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 294-303, March.
  11. Priest, George L, 1977. "Cartels and Patent License Arrangements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 309-77, October.
  12. Kato, Atsushi, 2004. "Patent pool enhances market competition," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 255-268, June.
  13. Sung-Hwan Kim, 2004. "Vertical Structure and Patent Pools," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-250, 07.
  14. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
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