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Patent pool under endogenous technology choice

Author

Listed:
  • Arijit Mukherjee

    (School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, UK)

Abstract

It is generally believed that patent pools by complementary input suppliers make the consumers, final goods producers and the society better off by reducing the complements problem. We show that this may not be the case under endogenous technology choice. Although a patent pool reduces input price, it may make the consumers and the society worse off by reducing innovation. We also show that a patent pool makes the input suppliers better off, but it may not make all final goods producers better off compared with non-cooperation between the input suppliers.

Suggested Citation

  • Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "Patent pool under endogenous technology choice," Discussion Paper Series 2013_07, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Jul 2013.
    • Handle: RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2013_07
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Complementary inputs; Patent pool; Innovation; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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