R&D Cooperation with Entry
We show the effects of entry by a non-innovating firm on the innovating firms' incentive for undertaking cooperative R&D, highlighting the impliations of knowledge spillover. Entry by a non-innovating firm may either increase or decrease the incentive for cooperative R&D comparted to no entry, depending on the innovating and the non-innovating firms' gains from knowledge spillover. The entry deterrence motive, which has so far been ignored in the literature, plays an important role in determing R&D organisation in our analysis.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2011|
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- Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 1995. "Equilibrium and Optimal Size of a Research Joint Venture in an Oligopoly with Spillovers," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 209-26, June.
- Marjit, Sugata, 1991. "Incentives for cooperative and non-cooperative R and D in duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 187-191, October.
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