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Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

  • AMIR, Rabah
  • EVSTIGNEEV, Igor
  • WOODERS, John

This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00541-9
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number 1650.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1650
Note: In : Games and Economic Behavior, 42, 183-207, 2003
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  1. AMIR, Rabah, 1994. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," CORE Discussion Papers 1994013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. D'ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1465, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. d'Aspremont, Claude & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 389-404, November.
  4. Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
  5. Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998. "Effects of One-way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R&D Cooperation," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  6. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis, . "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers RP 823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Athey, Susan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2001. "Investment and Market Dominance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  8. Theodore C. Bergstrom & Hal R. Varian, 1985. "When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 715-718.
  9. Amir, Rabah & Wooders, John, 2000. "One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-25, April.
  10. Martin, Stephen, 1996. "R & D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 733-741, April.
  11. Ruff, Larry E., 1969. "Research and technological progress in a cournot economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 397-415, December.
  12. Rabah Amir & Val E. Lambson, 2000. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 235-254.
  13. W. Salant, Stephen & Shaffer, Greg, 1998. "Optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 195-208, March.
  14. Röller, Lars-Hendrik & Siebert, Ralph & Tombak, Mihkel, 1997. "Why Firms Form Research Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1654, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Roberts, John & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1976. "On the existence of Cournot equilbrium without concave profit functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 112-117, August.
  16. Susan Athey & Armin Schmutzler, 1995. "Product and Process Flexibility in an Innovative Environment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 557-574, Winter.
  17. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 707-722.
  18. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-13, CIRANO.
  19. Kamien, Morton I & Zang, Israel, 1993. "Competing Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 23-40, Spring.
  20. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
  21. Griliches, Zvi, 1990. "Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
  22. repec:fth:harver:1473 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Comparing Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 441-59, June.
  24. Spence, Michael, 1984. "Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-21, January.
  25. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
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