IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ein/tuecis/0003.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Imitation, patent protection and welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Mukherjee, A.

    (ECIS, Technical University of Eindhoven)

  • Pennings, E.

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract

Once a new technology has been invented, there is a credible threat of imitation when patent protection is strong and imitation cost is low. Within the area of credible imitation, the innovator has an incentive to postpone technology adoption when the cost of imitation is relatively high. The possibility of licensing, however, eliminates or at least reduces the incentive for delayed technology adoption and may increase or decrease social welfare. Further, this paper explains the possibility of a forward contract on licensing.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Mukherjee, A. & Pennings, E., 2000. "Imitation, patent protection and welfare," Working Papers 00.03, Eindhoven Center for Innovation Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:ein:tuecis:0003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Leonard F.S. Wang & Arijit Mukherjee, 2014. "Patent Protection, Innovation and Technology Licensing," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3-4), pages 245-254, December.
    2. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno, 2014. "Innovation and imitation incentives in dynamic duopoly," MPRA Paper 59453, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Debasmita Basak & Andreas Hoefele & Arijit Mukherjee, 2014. "Union Bargaining Power and Product Innovation: Relevance of the Preference Function," CESifo Working Paper Series 5007, CESifo.
    4. Arijit Mukherjee & Achintya Ray, 2007. "Patents, imitation and welfare," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 227-236.
    5. Arijit Mukherjee, 2017. "Patent Protection and R&D with Endogenous Market Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 220-234, March.
    6. Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "Patent pool under endogenous technology choice," Discussion Paper Series 2013_07, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Jul 2013.
    7. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2006. "Patents and R&D with imitation and licensing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 196-201, November.
    8. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Arijit Mukherjee, 2014. "R&D Cooperation with Entry," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(1), pages 52-70, January.
    9. Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "Patent protection under endogenous product differentiation," Discussion Paper Series 2013_06, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Jul 2013.
    10. Yoon, Young-Ro, 2009. "Endogenous timing of actions under conflict between two types of second mover advantage," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 728-738, November.
    11. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno, 2015. "On the timing of innovation and imitation," MPRA Paper 69161, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Mukherjee, Arijit & Pennings, Enrico, 2011. "Unionization structure, licensing and innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 232-241, March.
    13. Arijit Mukherjee & Prabal Roy chowdhury, 2013. "Innovation and social desirability of merger," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 348-360.
    14. Yi-Fan Chen & Alireza Naghavi & Shin-Kun Peng, 2021. "Learning by supplying and competition threat," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 157(1), pages 121-148, February.
    15. Yi-Fan Chen & Alireza Naghavi & Shin-Kun Peng, 0. "Learning by supplying and competition threat," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 0, pages 1-28.
    16. Debasmita Basak & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Unionisation structure and product innovation," Discussion Papers 11/12, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
    17. Arijit Mukherjee & Achintya Ray, 2014. "Entry, Profit and Welfare under Asymmetric R&D Costs," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(3), pages 284-295, June.
    18. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno, 2016. "When should a winner take all, or pay some? Innovation and imitation incentives in a dynamic duopoly," MPRA Paper 75465, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    imitation; patenting; patent protection; innovation; licensing; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ein:tuecis:0003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ectuenl.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ectuenl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.