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Unionization Structure, Licensing and Innovation

Author

Listed:
  • Arijit Mukherjee

    (University of Nottingham and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy, UK)

  • Enrico Pennings

    (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Netherlands)

Abstract

This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'International Journal of Industrial Organization' , 29(2), 232-41. Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions. Unions have a clear preference for centralization only if productivity improvements are relatively small.

Suggested Citation

  • Arijit Mukherjee & Enrico Pennings, 2005. "Unionization Structure, Licensing and Innovation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-109/4, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Licensing; downstream market; upstream market; innovation; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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