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Effects of One-way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R&D Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Rabah Amir

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • John Wooders

    (University of Arizona)

Abstract

With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogenous innovator and imitator. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity - market shares, R&D shares, and profits - depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multi-directional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels (with an endogenous spillover parameter) is addressed. In particular, the latter can be zero under some conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998. "Effects of One-way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R&D Cooperation," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-09
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. W. Salant, Stephen & Shaffer, Greg, 1998. "Optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 195-208, March.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategic R&D; Cournot duopoly; one-Way spillovers; endogenous heterogenous; research Joint ventures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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