Statistics On Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Connor, John M. & Helmers, Claes Gustav, 2006. "Statistics On Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005," Staff Papers 28650, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- John Connor, 2006. "Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 195-223, December.
- Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow & Lynda Oswald, 2003.
"International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies,"
NBER Working Papers
9511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lynda Oswald & Valerie Suslow & Margaret Levenstein & Manuel Pastor, 2003. "International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies," Working Papers wp53, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
- Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow & Lynda Oswald, 2003. "International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 538, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- John M. Connor, 2003.
"Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement,"
03-12, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Connor, John M., 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, And Anticartel Enforcement," Staff Papers 28645, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Connor, John M., 2005. "Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal And Economic Evidence," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19254, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Artiga González, Tanja & Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David, 2013. "Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?," Working Papers on Finance 1309, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Sep 2017.
- repec:oup:jcomle:v:6:y:2010:i:2:p:335-374. is not listed on IDEAS
- Hüschelrath, Kai, 2008. "Is it Worth all the Trouble? The Costs and Benefits of Antitrust Enforcement," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-107, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Hoekman, Bernard & Martin, Will, 2012. "Reducing distortions in international commodity markets : an agenda for multilateral cooperation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5928, The World Bank.
- van Bergeijk, P.A.G., 2009. "What could anti-trust in the OECD do for development?," ISS Working Papers - General Series 18720, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
- Kai Hüschelrath & Nina Leheyda & Patrick Beschorner, 2010.
"Assessing The Effects Of A Road-Surfacing Cartel In Switzerland,"
Journal of Competition Law and Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 335-374.
- Hüschelrath, Kai & Leheyda, Nina & Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst, 2009. "Assessing the effects of a road surfacing cartel in Switzerland," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-082, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Bejger, Sylwester, 2012. "Cartel in the Indian cement industry: An attempt to identify it," Economics Discussion Papers 2012-18, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Sylwester Bejger, 2011. "Polish cement industry cartel - preliminary examination of collusion existence," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 4(1), pages 88-107, January.
- repec:ags:pdcbeh:204188 is not listed on IDEAS
- Aitor Ciarreta, 2012. "Cartels and regulation: effects on prices and real sales in sweden (1976–1990)," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 127-146, August.
- Tanja Artiga González & Markus Schmid & David Yermack, 2013. "Smokescreen: How Managers Behave When They Have Something To Hide," NBER Working Papers 18886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
Keywordscartel; price fixing; overcharge; antitrust enforcement; optimal deterrence;
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- B14 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Socialist; Marxist
- F29 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Other
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-LAW-2007-01-14 (Law & Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pae:wpaper:06-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Debby Weber). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dapurus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.