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Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs

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  • Pedro Mendi
  • Rafael Moner-Colonques
  • José Sempere-Monerris

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Suggested Citation

  • Pedro Mendi & Rafael Moner-Colonques & José Sempere-Monerris, 2011. "Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 359-378, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:3:p:359-378
    DOI: 10.1007/s13209-010-0034-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6313 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Chemla, G., 1999. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration," Papers 99-18, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    3. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    4. Spencer, Barbara J. & Jones, Ronald W., 1992. "Trade and protection in vertically related markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 31-55, February.
    5. Gilles Chemla, 2003. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 261-289, June.
    6. Newman, Andrew & Conconi, Paola & Alfaro, Laura & Fadinger, Harald, 2010. "Trade Policy and Firm Boundaries," CEPR Discussion Papers 7899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Laura Alfaro & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger & Andrew F. Newman, 2016. "Do Prices Determine Vertical Integration?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(3), pages 855-888.
    8. Gilles Chemla & Gilles Chemla, 2003. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure and Vertical Integration," Post-Print halshs-00679847, HAL.
    9. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2006. "What Determines Cartel Success?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 43-95, March.
    10. Ornelas, Emanuel & Turner, John L., 2008. "Trade liberalization, outsourcing, and the hold-up problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 225-241, January.
    11. Fung, K.C., 1987. "Industry structure, antitrust and tariffs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 447-456.
    12. Barbara J. Spencer & Ronald W. Jones, 1991. "Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(1), pages 153-170.
    13. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December.
    14. Levenstein, Margaret & Suslow, Valerie Y. & Oswald, Lynda J., 2003. "Contemporary International Cartels And Developing Countries: Economic Effects And Implications For Competition Policy," Working Papers 14590, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    15. Gordon H. Hanson & Raymond J. Mataloni & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2005. "Vertical Production Networks in Multinational Firms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(4), pages 664-678, November.
    16. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2007. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1321-1339, September.
    17. Pedro Mendi & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2007. "Sustainability of Collusion: Evidence from the Late 19th Century Basque Iron and Steel Industry," Faculty Working Papers 04/07, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
    18. Davidson, Carl, 1984. "Cartel stability and tariff policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3-4), pages 219-237, November.
    19. Pedro Mendi & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2009. "Sustainability of collusion: evidence from the late 19th century basque iron and steel industry," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 33(3), pages 385-405, September.
    20. Pedro Mendi, 2009. "Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 95-112, March.
    21. Webb, Steven B., 1980. "Tariffs, Cartels, Technology, and Growth in the German Steel Industry, 1879 to 1914," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 309-330, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, 2018. "Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 45(1 Year 20), pages 29-50, June.
    2. Mariana Cunha & Paula Sarmento, 2014. "Does Vertical Integration Promote Downstream Incomplete Collusion? An Evaluation of Static and Dynamic Stability," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-38, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vertical integration; Monopoly; Tariffs; F12; L12; L42;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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