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Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs

  • Pedro Mendi


  • Rafael Moner-Colonques


  • José Sempere-Monerris

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Article provided by Spanish Economic Association in its journal SERIEs.

Volume (Year): 2 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 359-378

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Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:3:p:359-378
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  1. Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy, 2004. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Levenstein, Margaret & Suslow, Valerie Y. & Oswald, Lynda J., 2003. "Contemporary International Cartels And Developing Countries: Economic Effects And Implications For Competition Policy," Working Papers 14590, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
  3. Gilles Chemla, 2003. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 261-289, 06.
  4. Andrew F. Newman & Laura Alfaro & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger, 2011. "Trade Policy and Firm Boundaries," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-035, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  5. G. Chemla, 1999. "Downstream competition, foreclosure, and vertical integration," THEMA Working Papers 99-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  6. Barbara J. Spencer & Ronald W. Jones, 1989. "Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets," NBER Working Papers 3023, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Barbara J. Spencer & Ronald W. Jones, 1989. "Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 2920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Webb, Steven B., 1980. "Tariffs, Cartels, Technology, and Growth in the German Steel Industry, 1879 to 1914," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(02), pages 309-330, June.
  9. Pedro Mendi & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2007. "Sustainability of Collusion: Evidence from the Late 19th Century Basque Iron and Steel Industry," Faculty Working Papers 04/07, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
  10. Fung, K.C., 1987. "Industry structure, antitrust and tariffs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 447-456.
  11. Laura Alfaro & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger & Andrew F. Newman, 2010. "Do Prices Determine Vertical Integration?," NBER Working Papers 16118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December.
  13. Davidson, Carl, 1984. "Cartel stability and tariff policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3-4), pages 219-237, November.
  14. Gordon H. Hanson & Raymond J. Mataloni & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2005. "Vertical Production Networks in Multinational Firms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(4), pages 664-678, November.
  15. Barbara J. Spencer & Ronald W. Jones, 1991. "Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 153-170.
  16. Chemla, Gilles, 2003. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6313, Paris Dauphine University.
  17. Pedro Mendi, 2009. "Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 95-112, March.
  18. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  19. Ornelas, Emanuel & Turner, John L., 2008. "Trade liberalization, outsourcing, and the hold-up problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 225-241, January.
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