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Product market competition and boundaries of the firm

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Etienne de Bettignies

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of product market competition on firm boundaries. In a duopoly setting, each retailer is associated with a manufacturer who must decide how to allocate property rights over a retail asset. Delegating property rights over the retail asset to an indepedent retailer (`disintegration') transfers incentives from the manufacturer to the retailer and has the benefit of increasing product quality and profits, owing to the retailer's superior efficiency. However, it also forces the manufacturer to forfeit part of the profits. Competition increases the net benefit from delegation and leads to more efficient, vertically disintegrated structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Etienne de Bettignies, 2006. "Product market competition and boundaries of the firm," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 948-970, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:39:y:2006:i:3:p:948-970
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bayo, Alberto & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E. & Gil, Ricard, 2009. "The determinants of changes in the organization of production: Evidence from Spanish plant-level data," IESE Research Papers D/783, IESE Business School.
    2. Jen Baggs & Jean‐Etienne De Bettignies, 2007. "Product Market Competition And Agency Costs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 289-323, June.
    3. Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique & Gil, Ricard & Bayo-Moriones, Alberto, 2015. "Outsourcing of peripheral services: Evidence from Spanish manufacturing plant-level data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 328-344.
    4. Fernando Merino, 2017. "Offshoring, outsourcing and the economic geography of Europe," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(2), pages 299-323, June.
    5. Aekapol Chongvilaivan & Jung Hur, 2012. "Trade Openness and Vertical Integration: Evidence from the U.S. Manufacturing Sector," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(4), pages 1242-1264, April.
    6. ATM Adnan & Nisar Ahmed, 2019. "The Transformation Of The Corporate Governance Model: A Literature Review," Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 8(3), pages 7-47.
    7. Barbara Spencer, 2005. "International outsourcing and incomplete contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(4), pages 1107-1135, November.
    8. Bayo-Moriones, Alberto & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique & Gil, Ricard, 2013. "'Make-or-Buy' of Peripheral Services in Manufacturing: Evidence from Spanish Plant-Level Data," IZA Discussion Papers 7138, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Choi, Kangsik & Lee, DongJoon, 2017. "Welfare-improving vertical separation with network externality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 115-118.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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