Trade And Protection In Vertically Related Markets
A domestic firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated supplier for a key intermediate product when both firms are Cournot competitors in the market for the final product. The foreign supplier generally charges its domestic rival a price for the input that exceeds the independent monopoly level and vertical foreclosure may occur. Domestic policies applied to the vertically related products can increase domestic welfare by reducing the price and increasing the availability of imported supplies of the input. Vertical integration in the foreign supplier has significant implications for all three domestic policies considered: a tariff or subsidy on imports of both products and a domestic production subsidy. The foreign vertically integrated firm tends to reduce its price for the input in response to an import tariff on the final product, whereas a simple monopoly supplier would respond by increasing its export price. Also domestic cost conditions for the production of the input can critically affect the desirability of a tax as apposed to a subsidy on intermediate imports.
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|Date of creation:||1989|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
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- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983.
"International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 707-722.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," NBER Working Papers 1192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Working Papers 518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
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"Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry,"
414, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1981. "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(3), pages 371-89, August.
- Sanyal, Kalyan K & Jones, Ronald W, 1982. "The Theory of Trade in Middle Products," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 16-31, March.
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