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Foreclosure with Incomplete Information


  • Lucy White


"We investigate the robustness of the new foreclosure doctrine and its associated welfare implications to the introduction of incomplete information. In particular, we let the upstream firm's marginal cost be private information, unknown to the downstream firms. The previous literature has argued that vertical integration is harmful because it allows an upstream monopolist to limit output to monopoly levels, whereas a disintegrated structure will "over-sell," producing more in equilibrium. By contrast, we find that with incomplete information, high-cost firms will often "under-sell" in equilibrium, that is, supply less than their monopoly output. Low-cost firms continue to over-sell, so all types of firms have a reason to integrate downstream, but this is socially harmful only for low-cost types. For high-cost firms vertical integration can be Pareto-improving, resulting in higher output, profits, and consumer surplus." Copyright 2007, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucy White, 2007. "Foreclosure with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 507-535, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:16:y:2007:i:2:p:507-535

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Reisinger, Markus & Schnitzer, Monika, 2008. "A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition," Discussion Papers in Economics 3189, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    2. Vianney Dequiedt & David Martimort, 2015. "Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2141-2182, July.
    3. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.
    4. Salvatore Piccolo & Markus Reisinger, 2011. "Exclusive Territories and Manufacturers' Collusion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(7), pages 1250-1266, July.
    5. Yaron Yehezkel, 2008. "Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing under asymmetric information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 115-143.
    6. Karp, Larry & Perloff, Jeffrey, 2011. "The iPhone Goes Downstream: Mandatory Universal Distribution∗," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7vc007jh, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    7. Markus Reisinger & Emanuele Tarantino, 2015. "Vertical integration, foreclosure, and productive efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 461-479, September.
    8. Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2012. "Vertical Separation with Private Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(559), pages 173-207, March.

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