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References listed on IDEAS
- Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1995.
"Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?,"
95-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1997. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Industrial Organization 9701003, EconWPA.
- Paula Sarmento, 2003. "Entry Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand: A Signalling Model Approach," CEF.UP Working Papers 0304, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Vareda, João, 2010. "Access regulation under asymmetric information about the entrant's efficiency," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 192-199, May.
More about this item
KeywordsEntry Invoking; Foreclosure; Signal; Vertical Integration;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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