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Strategic bypass deterrence

Author

Listed:
  • Francis Bloch
  • Axel Gautier

Abstract

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produce the network input more efficiently. We show that the incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers and welfare because competition is fiercer under bypass.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Bloch & Axel Gautier, 2017. "Strategic bypass deterrence," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2906, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2906
    Note: In : Journal of Regulatory Economics, 52, 189-210, 2017
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    Cited by:

    1. Malin Arve & Øystein Foros & Hans Jarle Kind, 2022. "Access price structure and entrant build-or-buy incentives in mobile markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 67-87, February.
    2. Keizo Mizuno & Ichiro Yoshino, 2015. "Overusing a bypass under cost-based access regulation: underinvestment with spillovers," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 29-57, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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