Two tales on resale
In some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers but also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are regulated. However, we show that (i) resale may increase prices and make consumers worse off and that (ii) standard "retail minus X regulation" may increase prices and harm consumers. Our analysis suggests that this is more likely if the number of integrated firms is small, the degree of product differentiation is low, and/or if competition is spatial.
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- Höffler, Felix & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2008.
"Two tales on resale,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1448-1460, November.
- Höffler, Felix & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2008. "Two tales on resale," Munich Reprints in Economics 19443, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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- Höffler, Felix & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2007. "Two Tales on Resale," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 198, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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