IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

What could anti-trust in the OECD do for development?

  • van Bergeijk, P.A.G.

The extra-territorial effects of cartels, mergers and other non-competitive activities require consideration especially if they harm consumers and firms in developing countries. This paper provides an overview of the available empirical literature regarding the impact of cartels, mergers and abuses of dominance that are rooted in the OECD. Typically the available evidence is not yet sufficiently comprehensive to allow robust conclusions, but (with no claim on accuracy), it seems reasonable that the direct impact on developing countries is very substantial and in welfare terms may exceed the contribution by Official Development Aid. OECD countries could contribute to development through the activities of their competition authorities and appropriate changes in legislation.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repub.eur.nl/pub/18720/wp473.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague in its series ISS Working Papers - General Series with number 18720.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ems:euriss:18720
Contact details of provider: Postal: Kortenaerkade 12, 2518 AX Den Haag
Phone: +31 70 4260 460
Fax: +31 70 4260 799
Web page: http://www.iss.nl/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. John M. Connor, 2004. "Global Antitrust Prosecutions of Modern International Cartels," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 239-267, 09.
  2. Griffin, Keith & Gurley, John, 1985. "Radical Analyses of Imperialism, the Third World, and the Transition to Socialism: A Survey Article," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 1089-1143, September.
  3. Haller, Stefanie A., 2009. "The impact of multinational entry on domestic market structure and investment," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 52-62, January.
  4. Röller, Lars-Hendrik & Stennek, Johan & Verboven, Frank, 2000. "Efficiency Gains from Mergers," Working Paper Series 543, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  5. Simon J. Evenett & Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2001. "International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2001-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  6. Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett & Krista Lucenti, 2005. "Anti-competitive Practices and Liberalising Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(7), pages 1029-1056, 07.
  7. Bertrand, Olivier & Ivaldi, Marc, 2006. "European Competition Policy in International Markets," IDEI Working Papers 419, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  8. Oliver BudzinskiWolfgang Kerber & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Internationale Wettbewerbspolitik aus ökonomischer Perspektive," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200602, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  9. David Hummels & Volodymyr Lugovskyy & Alexandre Skiba, 2007. "The Trade Reducing Effects of Market Power in International Shipping," NBER Working Papers 12914, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn, 2003. "European Merger Control: Do We Need an Efficiency Defence?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 57-85, March.
  11. Lynda Oswald & Valerie Suslow & Margaret Levenstein & Manuel Pastor, 2003. "International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies," Working Papers wp53, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
  12. John Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, 2006. "Statistics On Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005," Working Papers 06-11, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
  13. Gugler, Klaus & Mueller, Dennis C. & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin & Zulehner, Christine, 2003. "The effects of mergers: an international comparison," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 625-653, May.
  14. Bas Postema & Marie Goppelsroeder & Peter AG Bergeijk, 2006. "Cost and Benefits of Merger Control: An Applied Game Theoretic Perspective -super-* ," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 85-98, 02.
  15. Schut, Frederick T. & Van Bergeijk, Peter A. G., 1986. "International price discrimination: The pharmaceutical industry," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(9), pages 1141-1150, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ems:euriss:18720. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RePub)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.