International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s
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- Simon J. Evenett & Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2001. "International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(9), pages 1221-1245, September.
- Evenett, Simon J. & Levenstein, Margaret C. & Suslow, Valerie Y., 2001. "International cartel enforcement : lessons from the 1990s," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2680, The World Bank.
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