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Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation

Author

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  • Haufler, Andreas
  • Schjelderup, Guttorm

Abstract

The paper employs a model of dynamic price competition to study how international commodity taxation affects the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other’s home market. We consider both the choice of international tax principle and the harmonization of tax rates and differentiate between a setting where production costs differ between countries, and a setting where exogenous tax rate differentials are the only asymmetry. The conclusions derived from this model differ strongly from those obtained under the assumption of competitive product markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20417, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:20417
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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2006. "Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 1702, CESifo.
    2. Haufler, Andreas & Pflüger, Michael, 2003. "Market structure and the taxation of international trade," Discussion Papers in Economics 106, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A. & Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2006. "Federal tax autonomy and the limits of cooperation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 317-329, March.
    4. Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009. "Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 599-621, August.
    5. Andreas HaufLer & Guttorm Schjelderup & Frank Stähler, 2005. "Barriers to Trade and Imperfect Competition: The Choice of Commodity Tax Base," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(3), pages 281-300, May.
    6. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2013. "How should commodities be taxed? A supergame-theoretic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 196-205.
    7. Clément Carbonnier, 2005. "Is Tax Shifting Asymmetric? Evidence from French VAT reforms, 1995-2000," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590719, HAL.
    8. Kuo-Feng Kao & Cheng-Hau Peng, 2017. "Trade liberalization, forward-looking firms, and welfare," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(5), pages 999-1016, November.
    9. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Tax Evasion and Tacit Collusion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 41(5), pages 633-657, September.
    10. Clément Carbonnier, 2006. "Who pays commodity taxes? Evidence from French reforms, 1987-1999," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590515, HAL.
    11. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2019. "A strategic tax mechanism," MPRA Paper 93602, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Baumann, Florian & Charreire, Maxime & Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, 2020. "Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    13. Tim Friehe, 2014. "Tacit collusion and liability rules," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 453-469, December.

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