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Market Structure and the Taxation of International Trade

  • Andreas Haufler
  • Michael Pflüger

The paper compares non-cooperative commodity taxation under the destination and origin principles under a variety of different assumptions about market structure. We consider a model of international duopoly with either quantity or price competition of firms and either segmented or integrated markets, and a monopolistic competition model with mobile firms. In each setting the international spillovers of tax policy are isolated and evaluated at the Pareto efficient tax rate. The sign of the net spillover, and thus the direction that commodity tax competition will take, depends critically on whether lump-sum taxes are available or commodity taxes must be used to finance the government budget.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2003/wp-cesifo-2003-11/cesifo1_wp1080.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1080.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1080
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  1. Sijbren Cnossen, 1998. "Global Trends and Issues in Value Added Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 399-428, July.
  2. Lockwood, B., 2000. "Tax Competition and Tax Co-Ordination Under Destination and Origin Principles: A Synthesis," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 567, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Chang Woon Nam & Rüdiger Parsche & Barbara Schaden, 2001. "Measurement of Value Added Tax Evasion in Selected EU Countries on the Basis of National Accounts Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 431, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Martin, Philippe & Rogers, Carol Ann, 1995. "Industrial location and public infrastructure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 335-351, November.
  5. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September.
  6. Flam, Harry & Helpman, Elhanan, 1987. "Industrial policy under monopolistic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-2), pages 79-102, February.
  7. Haufler, Andreas & Pflüger, Michael, 2004. "International commodity taxation under monopolistic competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 20425, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  8. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1983. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," NBER Working Papers 1236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Brander, James A., 1995. "Strategic trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455 Elsevier.
  10. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal, 1998. "The comparison between destination and origin principles under imperfect competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 323-350, August.
  11. Cheng, Leonard K, 1988. "Assisting Domestic Industries under International Oligopoly: The Relevance of the Nature of Competition to Optimal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 746-58, September.
  12. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
  13. Lockwood, Ben, 1992. "Commodity Tax Competition Under Destination and Origin Principles," CEPR Discussion Papers 733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1986. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-172, March.
  15. Krugman, Paul, 1980. "Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 950-59, December.
  16. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20417, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  17. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," Working Papers 517, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  18. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  19. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  20. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Ben Lockwood & David Meza & Gareth Myles, 1994. "When are origin and destination regimes equivalent?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 5-24, February.
  22. Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya & T. N. Srinivasan, 1998. "Lectures on International Trade, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522470, June.
  23. Baldwin, Richard E. & Venables, Anthony J., 1995. "Regional economic integration," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1597-1644 Elsevier.
  24. Mikesell, John L., 2000. "Remote Vendors and American Sales and Use Taxation: The Balance between Fixing the Problem and Fixing the Tax," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 53(n. 4), pages 1273-86, December.
  25. Wilson, J.D., 1990. "Tax Competition With Interregional Differences In Factor Endowments," Working Papers 4, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy.
  26. Janeba, Eckhard, 1998. "Tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 135-153, February.
  27. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  28. Pfluger, Michael, 2001. " Ecological Dumping under Monopolistic Competition," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(4), pages 689-706, December.
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