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Trade Policy with Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition: Contradictory Results from Competing Assumptions

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  • Markusen, James R.
  • Venables, Anthony J

Abstract

A number of recent papers reach different conclusions concerning the effects of trade and industrial policy on imperfectly competitive industries; the implications for policy are therefore sensitive to assumptions concerning both firm behaviour and market structure. This paper sets out a single model within which policy can be examined under a variety of assumptions concerning market structures. The results obtained from this model can be compared to results already obtained in the literature, and the model allows further analysis of some interesting cases. We consider the four types of market structure generated by oligopoly versus free entry, and segmented markets versus integrated markets. By employing simple functional forms we are able to make direct comparisons between these cases. We conclude that the effects of trade and industrial policies are greater when markets are segmented than when they are integrated, and that, if transport costs are small, policy is more potent when the number of firms is fixed than when there is free entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Markusen, James R. & Venables, Anthony J, 1986. "Trade Policy with Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition: Contradictory Results from Competing Assumptions," CEPR Discussion Papers 120, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:120
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buiter, Willem H, 1981. "The Superiority of Contingent Rules over Fixed Rules in Models with Rational Expectations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(363), pages 647-670, September.
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    6. Dornbusch, Rudiger & Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Exchange Rates and the Current Account," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 960-971.
    7. Aizenman, Joshua & Frenkel, Jacob A, 1985. "Optimal Wage Indexation, Foreign Exchange Intervention, and Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 402-423.
    8. Stanley Fischer & Franco Modigliani, 1978. "Towards an understanding of the real effects and costs of inflation," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), pages 810-833.
    9. David K. H. Begg, 1980. "Rational Expectations and the Non-neutrality of Systematic Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(2), pages 293-303.
    10. David Currie & Paul Levine, 1985. "Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World," NBER Chapters,in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 228-273 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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