Collusive Intra-industry Trade
This paper examines the phenomenon of intraindustry trade under the condition of firm collusion. It is shown that with homogeneous goods, no collusive intraindustry trade can occur. But if the products are differentiated, firms will achieve their joint monopoly profits by exporting to each other's market. Thus, the observation of the occurrence of intraindustry trade does not necessarily mean the absence of collusion. The paper further studies the properties of such collusive trade. Despite the fact that the firms are joint monopolists, collusive two-way trade is still welfare superior to autarky for the world. Collusive intraindustry trade is also more sustainable if the firms' production costs are more similar.
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Volume (Year): 24 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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