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Towards Sustainable Urbanization: Exploring the Influence Paths of the Urban Environment on Bidders’ Collusive Willingness

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  • Xiaowei Wang

    (School of Management Science and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, China
    Department of Building and Real Estate, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong 999077, China)

  • Wuyan Long

    (International Research Center for Sustainable Built Environment, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, China)

  • Meiyue Sang

    (International Research Center for Sustainable Built Environment, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, China)

  • Yang Yang

    (Department of Building and Real Estate, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong 999077, China)

Abstract

Collusive bidding is a severe unethical and illegal practice in urban construction projects. This practice has been identified as the primary inhibitor of sustainable urban development. Collusive bidding is formed and can be profoundly impacted by the urban environment. Identifying the transmission routes of the impacts of the urban environment on collusive bidding is conducive to urban governors formulating collusive governance countermeasures to create a healthy pace of urbanization. Therefore, this study adopts the bootstrap method to empirically analyze the influence paths from the urban environment to bidders’ collusive willingness. The data come from 675 collusion cases in China’s urban construction projects and city environmental data. The research concludes that the urban environment affects collusive willingness mainly through indirect pathways. The number of collusive companies is the most critical mediating variable in the indirect path. Besides, when the collusive project and leading colluder are in the same province, little indirect utility can also be transmitted through the project profitability. These findings extend the body of knowledge on collusion-related studies in urban research. The study also offers practical implications, suggesting that urban governors and owners should take countermeasures to increase the difficulty of bidders to form a collusion team, thereby inhibiting collusive bidding.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaowei Wang & Wuyan Long & Meiyue Sang & Yang Yang, 2022. "Towards Sustainable Urbanization: Exploring the Influence Paths of the Urban Environment on Bidders’ Collusive Willingness," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-14, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlands:v:11:y:2022:i:2:p:280-:d:747859
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    Cited by:

    1. Pingyi Ma & Xueyan Zhao & Hua Li, 2023. "Spatial–Temporal Evolution of Socio-Ecological System Vulnerability on the Loess Plateau under Rapid Urbanization," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Xiaowei Wang & Kunhui Ye & Taozhi Zhuang & Rui Liu, 2022. "The Influence of Collusive Information Dissemination on Bidder’s Collusive Willingness in Urban Construction Projects," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-14, April.

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