Machine Learning with Screens for Detecting Bid-Rigging Cartels
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- Huber, Martin & Imhof, David, 2019. "Machine learning with screens for detecting bid-rigging cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 277-301.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsBid rigging detection; screening methods; variance screen; cover bidding screen; structural and behavioural screens; machine learning; lasso; ensemble methods;
- C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
- C45 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Neural Networks and Related Topics
- C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BIG-2018-04-09 (Big Data)
- NEP-CMP-2018-04-09 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-COM-2018-04-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2018-04-09 (Law & Economics)
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