Credible Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets
In an infinitely repeated game, sellers employ a trigger strategy of mutual forbearance from invasion of each other's markets, stabilized against invasion by the threat of Bertrand pricing. Contrary to conventional static models, this article shows stability for a wide range of transportation costs and present value parameters, and that increases in transportation costs tend to destabilize the collusive agreement. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association
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Volume (Year): 44 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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