Credible collusion in a model of spacial competition
In a spatial model with quantity setting firms, we analyze the possibility of cooperation in a long term relationship, where firms compete in location. It is found that endogeneizing the location decisions makes collusion more difficult.
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- Anderson, Simon P & Neven, Damien J, 1991. "Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 793-808, November.
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