Sustainable collusion on separate markets
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- BELLEFLAMME, Paul & BLOCH, Francis, 2009. "Sustainable collusion on separate markets," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2070, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francis Bloch & Paul Belleflamme, 2008. "Sustainable collusion on separate markets," Post-Print hal-00361679, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- John Gross & William L. Holahan, 2003. "Credible Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(1), pages 299-312, February.
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
- Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2004.
"Market sharing agreements and collusive networks,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(2), pages 387-411, May.
- Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2001. "Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks," Working Papers 443, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- ELLEFLAMME, Paul & BLOCH, Francis, 2004. "Market sharing agreements and collusive networks," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1711, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2004. "Market sharing agreements and collusive networks," Post-Print hal-01505789, HAL.
- Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
- Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
- Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, March.
- Bhattacharjea, Aditya & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2015.
"Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 42-50.
- Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2012. "Multi-Market Collusion With Territorial Allocation," Working Papers id:5170, eSocialSciences.
- Aditya Bhattacharjea & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2012. "Multi-market Collusion with Territorial Allocation," Working papers 217, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Kai Andree & Mike Schwan, 2012. "Collusive Market Sharing with Spatial Competition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3357-3364.
- Byford, Martin C. & Gans, Joshua S., 2014. "Collusion at the extensive margin," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 75-83.
- Yasunori Okumura, 2011. "A dynamic analysis of collusive networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 317-336, December.
More about this item
Keywordsimplicit collusion; market sharing agreements; production quotas; optimal punishment;
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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