Internal decision-making rules and collusion
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015.
"Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy,"
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- Rasch, Alexander, 2017. "Compatibility, network effects, and collusion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 39-43.
- Rasch, Alexander & Gössl, Florian, 2016. "The scope for collusion under different pricing schemes," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145759, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2017. "The optimal choice of internal decision-making structures in a network industry," Discussion Paper Series 166, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Sep 2017.
More about this item
KeywordsCollusion Delegation Holding company Merger Nash bargaining solution;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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