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Networks of Relations

Listed author(s):
  • Lippert, Steffen
  • Spagnolo, Giancarlo

We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model, relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to enforce cooperative agreements that could not be sustained if agents had no access to other network members’ sanctioning power and information. We identify conditions for network stability and in-network information transmission as well as conditions under which stable subnetworks inhibit more valuable larger networks.

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Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 28.

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Date of creation: Nov 2004
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:28
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