Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets with Quantity Competition
This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (Int Econ Rev 44:299–312, 2003 ) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 13 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/industrial+organization/journal/10842/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jehiel, Philippe, 1992. "Product differentiation and price collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 633-641, December.
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
- Chang, Myong-Hun, 1991. "The effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 453-469, September.
- Chang, Myong-Hun, 1992. "Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(4), pages 773-793, November.
- Stefano Colombo, 2012. "Collusion in two models of spatial competition with quantity-setting firms," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 48(1), pages 45-69, February.
- John Gross & William L. Holahan, 2003. "Credible Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(1), pages 299-312, February.
- Hackner, Jonas, 1995. "Endogenous product design in an infinitely repeated game," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 277-299.
- Alessandra Chirco & Marcella Scrimitore & Corrado Benassi, 2007. "Spatial Discrimination with Quantity Competition and High Transportation Costs: a Note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(1), pages 1-7.
- Kai Andree & Juljana Calaki, 2011. "Product differentiation in a spatial Cournot model with asymmetric demand," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(2), pages 1125-1130.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:1:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- José María Chamorro Rivas, 2000. "Spatial dispersion in cournot competition," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 145-152.
- Marcella Scrimitore, 2011. "Spatial Discrimination, Product Substitutability And Welfare," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 231-242, 07.