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Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multi-mercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos
[Efficacy and asymmetries of the leniency programs on a multi-market context: an analysis of the Colombian case under the FTA with the U.S]

Listed author(s):
  • Sánchez Navarro, Dennis
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    This paper analyzes the possible effects of asymmetries in the leniency programs on anti-competitive behavior of agents in multi-market context. In particular, this paper analyzes the Colombian leniency program and compares it with the United States program to identify possible differences between them that could affect the effectiveness of the leniency policy. El presente documento busca analizar los posibles efectos de las asimetrías en los programas de delación en diversas jurisdicciones territoriales sobre el comportamiento anticompetitivo de los agentes en un contexto multi-mercado. En particular, este trabajo analiza el programa de delación de Colombia y lo contrasta con el de Estados Unidos para identificar posibles diferencias entre ellos que pudieran incidir en la efectividad de la política de delación.

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48699/1/MPRA_paper_48699.pdf
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    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48699.

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    Date of creation: 25 Jul 2013
    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48699
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    1. Lefouili, Yassine & Roux, Catherine, 2012. "Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 624-640.
    2. Eric W. Bond & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2008. "Trade costs and multimarket collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1080-1104.
    3. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13637 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Klein, Gordon J., 2010. "Cartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-107, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Catherine Roux & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2007. "Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus," CESifo Working Paper Series 1995, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability," Discussion Paper 2004-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Akinbosoye, Osayi & Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2012. "On the stability of multimarket collusion in price-setting supergames," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 253-264.
    9. Simon J. Evenett & Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2001. "International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(9), pages 1221-1245, 09.
    10. Joan Ramón Borrell & Juan Luís Jiménez & Carmen García, 2012. "Evaluating antitrust leniency programs," Working Papers XREAP2012-01, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Jan 2012.
    11. Aubert, Cecile & Rey, Patrick & Kovacic, William E., 2006. "The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1241-1266, November.
    12. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004. "Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes," CEPR Discussion Papers 4840, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Choi, Jay Pil & Gerlach, Heiko, 2012. "Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 528-540.
    14. Brenner, Steffen, 2009. "An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 639-645, November.
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