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Endogenous firms’ organization, internal audit and leniency programs

Author

Listed:
  • Emilie Dargaud

    (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)

  • Armel Jacques

    (CEMOI, Université de La Réunion, Faculté de Droit et d'Economie, 15, avenue René Cassin, 97715 Saint-Denis cedex 9)

Abstract

When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are effcient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Endogenous firms’ organization, internal audit and leniency programs," Working Papers 1524, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon.
    • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1524
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    File URL: https://www.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2012/1524.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Catarina Marvão & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 4, pages 57-90, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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