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L'efficacité économique des programmes de clémence

  • Patrice Bougette

    ()

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR6227 - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis)

  • Christian Montet

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpellierain d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR5474 - INRA : UR1135 - CIHEAM - Université Montpellier I - Montpellier SupAgro)

  • Florent Venayre

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpellierain d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR5474 - INRA : UR1135 - CIHEAM - Université Montpellier I - Montpellier SupAgro)

Les nouveaux instruments dont se sont récemment dotées les autorités de concurrence, particulièrement en France, s'inscrivent dans la recherche d'une efficacité allocative accrue, soit en simplifiant les procédures, soit en permettant une lutte plus efficace contre les pratiques anticoncurrentielles - et c'est là l'objectif des programmes de clémence. L'objet de ce travail est d'analyser quelle peut être leur efficacité économique. Nous envisageons à cet effet la question de la détection des cartels et donc, par corollaire, celle de l'attractivité des mesures de clémence, mais aussi leur influence, plus mitigée, sur la stabilité des ententes. La problématique est ensuite mise en perspective en incluant dans le raisonnement les périodes qui précèdent et qui suivent le recours aux procédures de clémence, c'est-à-dire en étudiant les effets potentiels de la clémence sur la formation des ententes et les stratégies de représailles qui pourraient être adoptées à l'issue de la procédure.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00476807.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Publication status: Published, Concurrence et consommation, 2006, 146, 43-48
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00476807
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00476807/en/
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  1. Aubert, Cécile & Rey, Patrick & Kovacic, William E., 2006. "The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/13637, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Motta, M. & Polo, M., 1999. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Economics Working Papers eco99/23, European University Institute.
  3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs," Economics Working Paper Archive 527, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  4. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004. "Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes," CEPR Discussion Papers 4840, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Karine Brisset & Lionel Thomas, 2004. "Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 5-19, January.
  6. Philipp Festerling, 2005. "Cartel Prosecution and Leniency Programs: Corporate versus Individual Leniency," Economics Working Papers 2005-20, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  7. Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability," Discussion Paper 2004-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  9. Brenner, Steffen, 2009. "An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 639-645, November.
  10. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  11. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816632 is not listed on IDEAS
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