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Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs

Author

Listed:
  • Joan-Ramon Borrell
  • Juan Luis Jiménez
  • Carmen García

Abstract

This article identifies and then quantifies econometrically the impact of leniency programs on the perception of the effectiveness of antitrust policies in the business community using panel data for as many as 59 countries during a 14-year span. We use the dynamics of the gradual diffusion of leniency programs across countries and over time to evaluate the impact of the program, taking care of the bias caused by self-selection into the program. We find that leniency programs increase the perception of effectiveness by an order of magnitude ranging from 10 percent to 21 percent. Leniency programs have become weapons of mass dissuasion in the hands of antitrust enforcers against the more damaging forms of explicit collusion among rival firms in the market place.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan-Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez & Carmen García, 2014. "Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 107-136.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:10:y:2014:i:1:p:107-136.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nht017
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis Sánchez Navarro, 2013. "Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multimercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos," Estudios Económicos SIC 10905, Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio.
    2. Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Myong-Hun Chang, 2015. "When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 417-449.
    3. Carmen García & Joan-Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez & José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, 2024. "Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 283-320, October.
    4. Emmanuelle Auriol & Erling Hjelmeng & Tina Søreide, 2023. "Corporate criminals in a market context: enforcement and optimal sanctions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 225-287, October.
    5. Tebbe, Eva, 2018. "Once bitten, twice shy? Market size affects the effectiveness of a leniency program by (de-)activating hysteresis effects," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168304, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, revised 2018.
    6. Chen, Zhiqi & Ghosh, Subhadip & Ross, Thomas W., 2015. "Denying leniency to cartel instigators: Costs and benefits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 19-29.
    7. Massa, Massimo & dong, aileen & Zaldokas, Alminas, 2016. "Busted! Now What? Effects of Cartel Enforcement on Firm Value and Corporate Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 11470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Catalina Bolancé & Zuhair Bahraoui & Ramon Alemany, 2015. "Estimating extreme value cumulative distribution functions using bias-corrected kernel approaches," Working Papers XREAP2015-01, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Jan 2015.
    9. Anna Castañer & Mª Mercè Claramunt, 2014. "Optimal stop-loss reinsurance: a dependence analysis," Working Papers XREAP2014-04, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Apr 2014.
    10. Andrey V. Makarov, 2014. "Comparative Analusis Of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion In Some Transition Economies: Challenges For Effectiveness," HSE Working papers WP BRP 20/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    11. Joan-Ramon Borrell & Carmen García & Juan Luis Jiménez & José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, 2022. ""Cartel destabilization effect of leniency programs"," IREA Working Papers 202213, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Sep 2022.
    12. Jose Luis Castillo Mezarina, 2021. "The impact of free trade agreements in national markets: Evidence from the telecommunications sector in Latin America," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 860-903, September.
    13. Mariotti, Sergio & Marzano, Riccardo, 2021. "The effects of competition policy, regulatory quality and trust on inward FDI in host countries," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(6).
    14. Esther-Vayá & José-Ramón-García & Joaquim-Murillo & Javier-Romaní & Jordi-Suriñach, 2016. "“Economic Impact of Cruise Activity: The Port of Barcelona"," IREA Working Papers 201613, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Nov 2016.
    15. Sánchez Navarro, Dennis, 2013. "Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multi-mercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos [Efficacy and asymmetries of the leniency pro," MPRA Paper 48699, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Sergio Mariotti, 2023. "Competition policy in the new wave of global protectionism. Prospects for preserving a fdi-friendly institutional environment," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 50(2), pages 227-241, June.
    17. Sergio Pelaez & Juan David Gutiérrez, 2025. "The Gradual Impact of Sanctioning Cartels on Market Competition," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, December.
    18. Mercedes Ayuso & Montserrat Guillen & Jens Perch Nielsen, 2019. "Improving automobile insurance ratemaking using telematics: incorporating mileage and driver behaviour data," Transportation, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 735-752, June.
    19. Juan Luis Jiménez & Manuel Ojeda-Cabral & José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, 2023. "Who Blows the Whistle on Cartels? Finding the Leniency Applicant at the European Commission," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 123-153, September.
    20. Antonio Manresa & Ferran Sancho, 2012. "Leontief versus Ghosh: two faces of the same coin," Working Papers XREAP2012-18, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Oct 2012.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • O4 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity

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